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2 Developmental Change  
Abstract 
Mental representations of numerical magnitude are commonly thought to undergo 
discontinuous change over development in the form of a “representational shift”. This idea stems 
from an apparent categorical shift from logarithmic to linear patterns of numerical estimation on 
tasks that involve translating between numerical magnitudes and spatial positions (such as 
number-line estimation). However, the observed patterns of performance are broadly consistent 
with a fundamentally different view, based on psychophysical modeling of proportion 
estimation, that explains the data without appealing to discontinuous change in mental 
representations of numerical magnitude. The present study assessed these two theories’ abilities 
to account for the development of numerical estimation in 5- through 10-year-olds. The 
proportional account explained estimation patterns better than the logarithmic-to-linear-shift 
account for all age groups, at both group and individual levels. These findings contribute to our 
understanding of the nature and development of the mental representation of number and have 
more general implications for theories of cognitive developmental change.
         3 Developmental Change  
Developmental Change in Numerical Estimation  
Contemporary views of cognitive development and learning have been heavily influenced 
by a large body of work aimed at assessing the development of number representation. This work 
reveals a developmental sequence that occurs in a similar fashion across multiple age groups, 
tasks, and timescales (for a review, see Siegler, Thompson, & Opfer, 2009). The developmental 
sequence comprises an apparent discontinuous change in mental representations of numerical 
magnitude, often described as a representational shift. 
This view of the nature and development of numerical representations has shaped 
theoretical approaches to cognition, learning, and development (e.g. Opfer & Siegler, 2007; 
Siegler, Opfer, & Thompson, 2009). For example, some have suggested that these repeating 
patterns of change across multiple timescales are consistent with views of cognitive development 
held by contemporary information-processing and dynamic systems theorists (Siegler, 
Thompson, & Opfer, 2009). Microgenetic studies are thought to demonstrate the rapid 
replacement of one representation with another (Opfer & Siegler, 2007), thereby providing direct 
support for an overlapping-waves theory of cognitive change (Siegler, 1996). Furthermore, 
recent studies probing the origins of mathematics and the nature of cultural influences on 
mathematical cognition have also drawn on the concept of a representational shift (Dehaene, 
Izard, Spelke, & Pica, 2008; but see Cantlon, Cordes, Libertus, & Brannon, 2009).  
This body of work also has clear links to formal education and mathematics learning. 
(e.g. Krasa & Shunkwiler, 2009). Performance patterns that are thought to indicate the successful 
achievement of representational change are correlated with performance on standardized math 
tests and other measures of mathematical ability (Booth & Siegler, 2008; Laski & Siegler, 2007; 
Siegler & Booth, 2004; Siegler & Ramani, 2008, 2009; Siegler et al., 2009), and children with 
         
 
4 Developmental Change  
mathematical learning disability show a delay in exhibiting these patterns (Geary, Hoard, Byrd-
Craven, Nugent, & Numtee, 2007; Geary, Hoard, Nugent, & Byrd-Craven, 2008). The idea of a 
representational shift has also led to the development of brief, low-cost interventions that can 
improve math performance in lower-income children, purportedly by supporting changes in their 
number representations (Siegler & Ramani, 2008; 2009).  
Evidence for the representational shift view comes from a family of tasks that share a 
common structure: they are typically variations on number-line estimation, involving translations 
between numerical values and spatial positions on a line. To evaluate children’s performance, 
researchers examine the relationship between the magnitudes represented by given symbols 
(most commonly Arabic numerals, but sometimes visually presented sets of dots or other 
representations of magnitude) and participants’ estimates of those magnitudes (most commonly 
marked spatial positions on the number line that researchers convert into corresponding 
numerical values). When estimates are plotted as y-values against given magnitudes on the x-
axis, perfectly accurate performance falls on the line y = x. Deviation from this line provides a 
measure of estimation error. Individuals producing high rates of estimation error tend to 
overestimate smaller values on the number line, such that their estimates appear better 
characterized as a logarithmic curve than as a straight line (e.g. Berteletti, Lucangeli, Piazza, 
Dehaene, & Zorzi, 2010; Booth & Siegler, 2006, 2008; Laski & Siegler, 2007; Opfer & Siegler, 
2007; Siegler & Opfer, 2003). 
Possibly the first study to note this pattern examined 2nd, 4th, and 6th graders’ performance 
with 0-100 and 0-1000 number lines (Siegler & Opfer, 2003). When asked to estimate the 
positions of numbers on 0-1000 number lines, 6th graders produced estimates that were linearly 
related to the presented values, while 2nd graders’ estimates were better fit with a logarithmic 
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curve. Fourth graders’ estimates, on the other hand, showed both patterns: roughly half were 
classified as logarithmic and half as linear. Moreover, individual 2nd graders whose estimates 
were categorized as logarithmic on the 0-1000 number line produced more linear estimates on a 
smaller, more familiar number range (0-100), showing that the same child could produce both 
estimation patterns depending on the range of numbers presented. A similar developmental 
pattern arose for kindergarteners and 1st and 2nd graders tested on a 0-100 number line (Siegler & 
Booth, 2004). Kindergarteners’ estimates were better fit by a logarithmic function, 2nd graders’
estimates were better fit by a linear function, and 1st graders were split between the two (for 
similar findings and interpretation see also Booth & Siegler, 2006, 2008; Laski & Siegler, 2007; 
Opfer & Siegler, 2007; Opfer & Thompson, 2008). These logarithmic and linear estimation 
patterns have also been noted in preschool-aged children (Berteletti et al., 2010; Siegler & 
Ramani, 2008) as well as across language and culture (see Dehaene et al., 2008; Siegler & Mu, 
2008). 
The representational-shift explanation accounts for these data by supposing that 
logarithmic or linear estimation patterns provide direct readouts of the participants’ mental 
representations of number. Thus, children have access to multiple types of coexisting mental 
number representations, drawing upon linear representations for tasks spanning more familiar 
numerical ranges and logarithmic representations for unfamiliar ranges. Over the course of
development and experience, children learn to rely primarily on the mature, linear representation 
of number that supports accurate, linear estimation.  
Proponents of this view have conducted several studies designed to promote the 
representational shift by encouraging children’s use of linear, rather than logarithmic, 
representations. For example, Siegler and Booth (2004) asked children to estimate the positions
         
 
6 Developmental Change  
of multiple numbers on a single number line. This led to a marked improvement on subsequent 
number-line tasks, with improvement defined as the degree to which children produced linear 
estimation patterns. Opfer and Siegler (2007) found that feedback for numbers that should 
correspond to the greatest discrepancy between logarithmic and linear representations (e.g., 150 
on a 0-1000 number line) is particularly effective in improving performance. Further studies 
have shown similar effects (characterized as a shift from logarithmic to linear estimation 
performance) using progressive alignment cues (Thompson & Opfer, 2010) and experience with 
linear numerical board games (Siegler & Ramani, 2008, 2009). Improvement can be dramatic 
and sudden, appearing even after only a single feedback trial and occurring broadly across the 
entire range of numbers tested. This is thought to provide particularly strong evidence for the 
idea of a representational shift, as children shift from profoundly biased, more logarithmic 
estimation patterns to much more linear patterns within a single testing session (Opfer & Siegler, 
2007; but see Barth, Slusser, Cohen, & Paladino, 2011). 
Some critics of the representational-shift hypothesis have argued that the choice of a 
logarithmic model to explain children’s estimation performance is problematic, and that 
relatively younger children’s estimates may be better explained by a two-segment linear model, 
with each segment having a different slope. Rationale for one version of this model stems from
the notion that estimation errors may differ when the given numbers fall within vs. outside a 
child’s count range (Ebersbach, Luwel, Frick, Onghena, & Verschaffel, 2008). In support of their 
hypothesis, these researchers argued that kindergarteners’ and 1st graders’ number-line estimates 
were better characterized by a segmented linear model than by a logarithmic one, and that the 
change point for a particular child (the point at which the two linear models were segmented) 
was significantly correlated with his or her count range. Other researchers also report evidence 
         
 
   
 
7 Developmental Change  
for a segmented linear model based on 1st graders’ estimates with 0-100 number lines (Moeller, 
Pixner, Kaufmann, & Nuerk, 2009). These authors postulated that the change point in the 
segmented linear model represents a change from processing single-digit to two-digit numbers, 
rather than a move from a familiar to an unfamiliar number range. Both versions of the
segmented linear hypothesis describe development in terms of the eventual integration of the 
two-part representation into one holistic linear representation (see also Moeller & Nuerk, 2011; 
but see Dehaene et al., 2008; Young & Opfer, 2011). 
The use of logarithmic and linear models is nevertheless clearly theoretically motivated
in numerical estimation research. In fact, there is a long-standing debate as to whether internal 
representations of numerical magnitude are organized in a linear or a logarithmic fashion. Some
maintain that underlying representations of number are logarithmically organized (an idea rooted 
in the Weber-Fechner Law stating that the magnitude of sensation is logarithmically related to 
objective stimulus intensity; see for example Dehaene, 1997). Others posit that underlying 
representations of number are linearly spaced and that logarithmic patterns may emerge as a 
result of scalar variability (variability that increases in proportion to numerical magnitude; see 
for example Brannon, Wusthoff, Gallistel, & Gibbon, 2001; Gallistel & Gelman, 1992; cf. 
Gallistel, 2011). 
Number-line estimation has been identified as a possible means to reconcile this debate. 
For example, Siegler and Opfer (2003) argued against the idea of a linear representation with 
scalar variability after failing to observe scalar variability in number-line estimation tasks. 
However, typical bounded number-line tasks elicit estimates relative to marked endpoints, 
prompting participants to make judgments about relative numerical magnitude within a restricted 
range. Because the task puts an upper bound on participants’ responses, thereby affecting the 
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variability of their estimates, the absence of scalar variability in number-line estimates does not 
imply a lack of scalar variability in mental representations of numerical magnitude (see also 
Cohen & Blanc-Goldhammer, 2011). This suggests that typical number-line estimation tasks are 
poorly suited to resolving these longstanding debates over logarithmic vs. linear mental 
representations of number. 
The question of how (and whether) to draw conclusions about internal scales of 
magnitude from various types of estimation tasks is complex (e.g. Cantlon et al.,  2009; Dehaene 
et al., 2009; Izard & Dehaene, 2008; Krueger, 1989; Laming, 1997; Poulton, 1989; 
Teghtsoonian, 1973; see also Vlaev, Chater, Stewart, & Brown, 2011). Numerical estimation is 
no exception, and of course we do not solve this problem here. However, there are clear 
difficulties with the conclusions about mental representations that are commonly drawn from
performance on number-line estimation tasks. This paper will focus on trying to resolve some of 
these. One difficulty is that the categorization of estimation data as either logarithmic or linear is 
questionable, even though most studies only consider these two possibilities (cf. Ebersbach et al., 
2008; Moeller et al., 2009; Siegler & Opfer, 2003). A second concern is that by applying 
logarithmic and linear models to number-line estimation data, researchers effectively treat them
as simple tasks that require the estimation of single numerical magnitudes in isolation, failing to 
acknowledge task constraints with important implications for interpretation. A third potential 
problem is that typical analyses of these tasks attribute variations in number-line estimation 
solely to numerical processing and numerical representations, assuming that the spatial 
components of the task do not introduce their own variations. This assumption is deeply 
problematic given a wealth of research on the estimation of spatial position in children and adults 
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(e.g. Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Vevea, 2000; Huttenlocher, Newcombe, & Sandberg, 1994). We
return to the first two points in more detail below, and to the third in the General Discussion.  
Theoretical Models Based on Proportional Reasoning 
 The bounded nature of the typical number-line estimation task strongly suggests a need 
to look beyond the models of unbounded numerical magnitude most often applied to these data. 
Of course, related ideas about the importance of endpoints and other reference points in this task 
have been noted before. Ebersbach and colleagues (2008, p. 13) recognized the problem of 
applying inappropriate models to explicitly bounded tasks, suggesting that the assumptions of 
models tested in many previous studies “might need to be adapted to magnitude estimation tasks 
that involve anchored response scales.” These authors also noted that anchors could be provided 
explicitly (like the marked endpoints) or even generated by the participants themselves. Siegler 
and Opfer (2003) also considered an informal “landmark-based proportionality model,” allowing 
for the possibility that participants mentally divide the number line in half or in quarters, creating 
reference points to guide their estimates. Thus, while the existence of reference points in the 
number-line task has been widely recognized, far less attention has been paid to the important 
implications of the task’s bounded nature for the interpretation of estimation data (but see 
Cantlon et al., 2009). 
Recently, several research groups have approached this problem by applying a 
psychophysical model of proportion judgment, appropriate for bounded estimation tasks, to 
number-line estimation data. This model was originally developed for tasks involving judgments 
of perceptual magnitude (see Hollands & Dyre, 2000; Hollands, Tanaka, & Dyre, 2002; Spence, 
1990). It does an excellent job of explaining estimation bias in number-line tasks as well, both 
for 7-year-olds (Barth & Paladino, 2011) and for adults (Cohen & Blanc-Goldhammer, 2011; 
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Sullivan, Juhasz, Slattery, & Barth, 2011). Logically, the justification for the use of this model 
stems from the fact that number-line tasks require the estimation of a smaller magnitude (the 
value presented) relative to a larger one (the value given at the upper endpoint of the line), 
thereby eliciting a judgment of a numerical proportion rather than an unbounded numerical 
magnitude. Thus a bounded number-line task with Arabic numerals requires participants to 
retrieve the magnitudes associated with the given values from memory (for example, by 
retrieving the magnitudes associated with “43” and “100” on a 0-100 number line), to estimate 
the proportion of the two magnitudes, and to produce a corresponding spatial proportion by 
marking the number line in the appropriate position.  
The psychophysical model of proportion judgment discussed here is derived from
Stevens’ Power Law, which expresses the relationship between the estimated magnitude of a 
stimulus and its actual magnitude as y = αx β. The exponent β is a free parameter that may be 
thought of as a quantification of bias associated with estimating a particular type of stimulus 
magnitude (such as brightness, area, or length), and α is a scaling parameter. Here, “estimated 
magnitude” would be the participant’s estimated position on a number line (which the researcher 
typically converts to a corresponding numerical value) and “actual magnitude” would be the 
value of the presented numeral (see Figure 1A). Importantly, like the logarithmic and linear 
functions used to model estimates in many number-line studies, Stevens’ Power Law has been 
considered as a model of numerical estimation in various tasks (e.g. Cordes, Gelman, Gallistel, 
& Whalen, 2001; Izard & Dehaene, 2008; Shepard, Kilpatric, & Cunningham, 1975; Siegler & 
Opfer, 2003; Stevens & Galanter, 1957; see also Krueger, 1989, for a review). 
Spence (1990) suggested that bias in proportion judgments arises from the biases 
associated with estimating the component part and whole magnitudes. He adapted the power law 
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for proportional magnitude judgments, modifying the basic power function to define perceived 
magnitude (y) in terms of the presented range (such that the scaling parameter included in most 
formulations of Stevens’ Law cancels out, leaving the exponent β as the single free parameter). 
When this model is applied to a 0-100 number line task, for example, estimates are predicted by 
the function y = x β/ (x β + (100 - x) β). Spence’s model predicts that estimates of proportions will 
take the form of S-shaped or reverse S-shaped curves, depending on the particular value of β in 
question (see Figure 1B). Spence’s original formulation cannot account for the patterns of
performance that would arise from an observer using reference points in addition to the two 
endpoints. However, a generalized form (the Cyclical Power Model, or CPM; Hollands & Dyre, 
2000) predicts a pattern of over- and underestimation, akin to that predicted by Spence’s model, 
which repeats between every pair of reference points used. Thus the generalized model is 
equivalent to the basic Spence model when the number of reference points is fixed at two (the 
endpoints; see Figure 1B, the “one-cycle” version of the model). But if three reference points are 
used, as when estimates are made relative to the two endpoints plus a given or inferred midpoint, 
a “two-cycle” version of the model results (see Figure 1C).  
The patterns of estimation bias predicted by the psychophysical model described above 
have been clearly and uncontroversially demonstrated in a variety of perceptual tasks that were 
either explicitly or implicitly proportional (Hollands & Dyre, 2000; Hollands, Tanaka, & Dyre, 
2002). For example, this pattern was found in a study in which participants estimated the relative 
quantities of black dots and white dots in a mixed collection (Varey, Mellers, & Birnbaum, 1990; 
see also Erlick, 1964; Spence, 1990; Spence & Krizel, 1994; Stevens & Galanter, 1957). Yet the 
idea that these patterns can also be seen in numerical estimation data is less readily accepted (see
Opfer, Siegler, & Young, 2011; for a reply, see Barth et al., 2011). To our knowledge, Barth and 
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Paladino (2011) were the first to call attention to this pattern in children’s number-line estimation 
data, as were Cohen and Blanc-Goldhammer (2011) for adults’ data, even though the same
pattern can be seen in estimates gathered in many previous studies (see, for example, Booth & 
Siegler, 2006, Figure 2; Ebersbach et al., 2008, Figure 2; Laski & Siegler, 2007, Figures 1 & 2; 
Moeller et al, 2009, Figure 3; Siegler & Booth, 2004, Figure 3; Siegler & Mu, 2008, Figure 1).
Why have these systematic patterns of estimation bias apparently gone unnoticed in 
number-line studies? We can think of two possibilities. First, there is a resounding tendency for 
researchers to sample heavily from the lower end of the number line and scarcely from the upper 
end. This is because most studies aim specifically to distinguish between logarithmic and linear 
fits in the context of the representational-shift hypothesis, rather than to entertain alternative 
hypotheses (cf. Ebersbach et al., 2008; Moeller et al, 2009). This practice focuses on 
participants’ propensity to overestimate small numbers, but yields little data to reveal the details 
of underestimation patterns for larger numbers. Second, contingent on the value of the exponent 
(β) and on the participant’s use of reference points, unbounded and cyclical power models may 
closely resemble logarithmic or linear models (see Figure 1), particularly if numbers near the 
upper end of the range are sparsely sampled. 
Developmental Change in the Proportion-Judgment Account  
If the observed developmental patterns in these estimation data do not indicate a log-to-
linear shift, then what is the nature of the observed change over development? The proportion-
judgment account of number-line estimation can accommodate a notion of gradual change quite 
different from the categorical change required by the representational-shift account. 
Developmental change in numerical estimation, here, may be described in terms of (at least) two 
distinct kinds of changes. The first of these is change in the value of the β parameter, which 
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reflects the degree of bias associated with the estimation of individual magnitudes (such as the 
estimation of magnitudes of different Arabic numerals in typical number-line tasks). The 
observed β parameter may change gradually with age or experience, such that estimates are more 
accurate for older and more experienced observers (presumably with values of β eventually 
converging on 1, at which point proportion-judgment models are equivalent to y = x; see Figure 
1). Some evidence in support of this idea has been found in number-line tasks (Barth & Paladino, 
2011) and in perceptual tasks (Hollands & Dyre, 2000; Spence & Krizel, 1994).  
Second, learning and development may lead to changes in the use of reference points, 
including both marked endpoints and, potentially, an inferred midpoint. Our theoretical account 
predicts that increased accuracy is linked to the number of reference points utilized by a 
participant and offers a quantitative explanation of this link. For example, a participant with a 
poor understanding of the task structure or an incomplete knowledge of the numerical range in 
question may use only the lower endpoint value, treating the task as an open-ended magnitude 
judgment rather than a proportion judgment. This participant should therefore produce estimates 
well described by an unbounded power function 1 (Stevens’ Power Law; see Figure 1A). 
Alternatively, a participant appropriately referencing both the given lower and upper 
endpoint values on the number line would produce the pattern of over- and under-estimation 
predicted by the one-cycle version of the proportional model (Figure 1B). A participant who 
infers a third reference point at the line’s midpoint would produce the cyclical pattern of over- 
and under-estimation corresponding to the two-cycle version of the model (Figure 1C). While 
each progression – from an unbounded power to a one-cycle proportional to a two-cycle 
proportional version of the model – results in an increase in overall accuracy, this view requires 
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no representational shift to explain developmental change from more logarithmic-looking to 
more linear-looking estimation patterns.
The Present Study 
Prior work demonstrated that the proportion estimation model described earlier can 
account for estimation patterns arising from a single number-line task presented to 5- and 7-year-
olds (Barth & Paladino, 2011). That study, however, provided little information about change 
over development. To address this question, the present study investigates how predictions of the 
proportion-judgment account map onto performance across age and experience through a series 
of cross-sectional experiments, spanning 5 years. We also present children with multiple 
numerical ranges to evaluate the claim that different estimation patterns for different ranges 
within children indicate the presence of multiple types of mental number representations (e.g. 
Siegler & Opfer, 2003). For all experiments, we compare the predictions of the proportional 
approach to those of the log-to-linear representational-shift account 2. 
Broadly, we predict that children’s estimation data will be better explained by the 
proportion-judgment account than by the representational-shift account. We also predict that 
estimates will follow the developmental progression described earlier, from the unbounded 
power function (reflecting effective use of the lower endpoint, but not the upper) to a one-cycle 
version of the proportional model (reflecting the use of both endpoints) to a two-cycle version 
(reflecting the use of both endpoints plus a midpoint). Finally, we predict that values of the β
parameter will tend to change with age and experience, such that they will be closer to 1 
(corresponding to perfect accuracy) for older children and for children tested on a more familiar 
number range.  
Experiment 1 
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Method 
Participants. A total of 33 five- and six-year-old children (16 males and 17 females, 
mean age 5;11) completed the task. Most children were recruited through a database of families 
residing in the Central Connecticut area and were tested in a quiet laboratory room. Some
children were recruited and tested at local venues such as a nearby children’s museum. No 
questions were asked about socio-economic status, race, or ethnicity, but children were 
presumably representative of the community from which they were drawn. In this community, 
84% of adults have a high-school diploma and 30% have a bachelor’s degree. Most residents 
identify as white (80%), black (12%) or Asian (3%) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). 
Stimuli. Children were presented with booklets of pages (27.9 x 10.8 cm) with a 23 cm 
line printed in the center of each page. The left end of the line was marked with 0 and the right 
end of the line was marked with 20 or 100, depending on the condition. The target number for 
each trial was printed 2 cm above the center of the number line, as in many previous studies of 
number-line estimation (e.g. Booth & Siegler, 2006; Opfer & Siegler, 2007; Siegler & Opfer, 
2003; Thompson & Opfer, 2010). 
Design. Each child completed two conditions. The “familiar” condition used a smaller 
numerical range, likely to be more familiar to the child, with a number line bounded by 0 and 20. 
The “unfamiliar” condition used a larger numerical range, likely to be less familiar to this age 
group, with a number line bounded by 0 and 100. Children always completed the familiar 
number range first 3. Test trials used a selection of numbers sampled roughly evenly across the 
given number range (0-20 or 0-100 depending on the condition), with no numbers repeated (see 
Appendix A for a complete list of numbers tested). The order of the trials was randomized for 
each child.
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Procedure. The procedure was similar to that reported in Barth and Paladino (2011), 
which was modeled directly on the procedure of Booth and Siegler (2006). Experimenters first 
introduced the task for the familiar number range: “We’re going to play a game with number 
lines. I’ll ask you to show me where you think some number should go on the number line. 
When you decide where the number goes, make a line through the number line.” There was one 
practice trial at the beginning of each condition; for the initial 0-20 condition, the experimenter 
prompted children to mark a new (blank) number line to show where 10 should go. After 
responding, children were shown a number line marked in the middle. The experimenter asked if 
they knew why 10 went there and then explained, “Because 10 is half of 20, it goes right in the 
middle between 0 and 20. So 10 goes right there, but it’s the only number that goes there.” On 
the first test trial, if children marked the halfway point, the experimenter reminded them that 
only 10 goes in the middle. Test trials immediately followed the single practice trial. The 
experimenter read off the Arabic numeral printed above each number line saying, “Where would 
you put [X]?” for each trial. After the children responded by marking the line, experimenters 
concluded the trial by saying, “Thank you.” When switching to the unfamiliar condition, 
experimenters would say, “Now we’re going to play the game with different numbers. Zero still 
goes here at this end, but now 100 is here at the other end.” This was followed by the same single 
practice trial described above, using 50 as the halfway point.  
Results 
Data from children producing responses that were uncorrelated with the presented 
number (Spearman rank correlation, rs, p>.05) or were negatively correlated (rs, p<.05) on either 
or both conditions were excluded from the following analyses (n=8). Data from children who 
marked over 90% of their responses within a single region comprising 10% of the number line 
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on either or both conditions were also excluded (n=5). This resulted in a total of 20 children: 5 
five-year-olds (mean age 5;7) and 15 six-year-olds (mean age 6;6). We deliberately chose these 
exclusion criteria because data from children with extreme response biases or uncorrelated 
responses are difficult or impossible to interpret. 
As a measure of general accuracy, each child’s mean Percent Absolute Error (see Booth 
& Siegler, 2006; 2008) was computed for each task.  This was calculated by dividing the 
absolute difference between the number corresponding to the child’s estimate and the presented 
number by the numerical range, then multiplying the quotient by 100 to express a percentage:  
Patterns of estimation biases were evaluated by comparing the models described earlier to 
those comprising the representational-shift account (logarithmic and linear models). Models 
comprising the proportion-judgment account included an unbounded power function (a single-
parameter version of Stevens’ Power Law, with a fixed scaling factor; see Figure 1A) and the 
one- and two-cycle versions of the proportional power model (see Figures 1B and 1C; Hollands 
& Dyre, 2000). Constraints were set such that no model was allowed to project values less than 
zero.
Formal model comparisons determined which model best predicted children’s 
performance patterns 4. Comparisons were made using AICc scores (Akaike’s Information 
Criterion, corrected for small sample sizes) as in Barth and Paladino (2011). Differences in AICc 
scores provide a measure of how well different models can explain data, taking into account both 
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“goodness of fit” and model complexity, where complexity is defined in terms of number of 
parameters (e.g. Burnham & Anderson, 2002). Because the number of parameters in a model is 
not the only measure of complexity, we also used a second model selection technique for all of 
our group analyses (Leave-One-Out Cross-Validation or LOOCV, which assesses how a model 
will generalize to an independent data set 5, Browne, 2000 ; see Opfer et al., 2011, and Barth et 
al., 2011 for recent discussion). The findings reported here are based on AICc and LOOCV 
analyses, but we also report R2 values for each fit because of this measure’s greater familiarity to 
readers 6. 
Familiar range (0-20). Performance on this task was highly accurate, with a mean PAE 
of just under 10% (see Figure 2A). There was little evidence of systematic estimation bias in the 
group median estimates, resulting in rather linear performance (R2 = .980) and a relatively poor 
fit of the logarithmic model (R2 = .776). Further, the linear model was ranked first over the two-
cycle (R2 = .935), one-cycle (R2 = .932), and unbounded power functions (R2 = .897). With a 
slope of .891 (intercept of ~ 0), group median performance on this numerical range is very near 
true accuracy (y = x) (see Appendix B). This result is consistent with 5- and 6-year-olds’ 
medians considered separately (see Figures 2B and 2C). 
An examination of individual children’s estimates reveals, however, that only 30% of the 
children (n=6) produced estimates that were best explained by a linear model. All other children 
produced estimates that were best predicted by the proportional reasoning account (unbounded 
power, n=6; one-cycle, n=5; two-cycle, n=3).  
Unfamiliar range (0-100). Performance was less accurate on the 0-100 number range (see 
Figure 2D), with a mean PAE of 15.7%. When only linear and logarithmic models are 
considered, our 5- to 6-year-olds’ group median performance on the 0-100 number-line is better 
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characterized by the linear model (R2=.944) than by the logarithmic model (R2=.838). However, 
the unbounded power function (R2=.952) is preferred over all others considered here for the 
group median data, ranking first over the linear model as well as the one-cycle (R2=.927), or 
two-cycle (R2=.766) proportional model (see Appendix B). 
The majority of individual children (65%, n=13) produced estimation patterns for the 0-
100 task that were best explained by the proportion-judgment account. Most of the remaining 
children (n=6) produced estimates best characterized by a logarithmic model.
Finally, we examined performance patterns of 5-year-olds (the youngest portion of our 
sample) and 6-year-olds (the majority of the sample) on the 0-100 task separately (see Figures 
2E and 2F). Although the logarithmic model fits 5-year-olds’ median data reasonably well 
(R2=.864), the unbounded power function (R2=.866) offers the best explanation (with 
comparatively little support for linear, one-cycle, or two-cycle models as explanations of the 5-
year-olds’ median data). In contrast, 6-year-olds’ median performance is more linear (R2=.931) 
than logarithmic (R2=.864). However, the AICc comparison and LOOCV analysis shows that 6-
year-olds’ systematic estimation bias (see Figure 2F) is best characterized by the one-cycle 
proportion-judgment model (R2=.926). This characterization is also borne out in the individual 
data (with nine children exhibiting one-cycle patterns, eight children exhibiting two-cycle 
patterns, and seven simply showing linear estimation patterns).   
Comparison across tasks. Unsurprisingly, overall accuracy decreased from the 0-20 
number range to the 0-100 range. The linear model was preferred for group median estimates on 
the 0-20 task, while the unbounded power function was preferred for group medians on the 0-100 
task. When 5- and 6-year-olds’ performance patterns are considered separately, 5-year-olds’ 
group median estimates were linear for the more familiar range, but highly biased for the less 
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familiar range such that the unbounded power function was preferred for the 0-100 task. 
Likewise, 6-year-olds’ group median estimates were best fit by a linear model for the familiar 
range, but by a one-cycle proportional model for the unfamiliar range. 
Discussion
Two important findings emerge from these data. First, for the more familiar 0-20 
numerical range, group median estimates were both quite linear and highly accurate. But at the 
individual level, even for the familiar range, estimates were better explained by the proportion-
judgment account, suggesting that the linear group median estimates do not provide evidence of 
the use of linear mental representations by individual children. Second, for the less familiar 0-
100 numerical range, estimation biases were apparent at the group level as well as at the 
individual level, with group medians best described by the unbounded power function. The 
estimates of the 5-year-olds in the sample (the low end of the age range) were also best described 
by the unbounded power function. The 6-year-olds’ median estimates, on the other hand, were 
best explained by the one-cycle proportional model, consistent with the idea that these children 
were better able to apply appropriate proportional reasoning.  
This change from an unbounded power function to a one-cycle version of the 
proportional model may reflect children’s developing understanding of the upper end of the 
number line. That is, 5-year-old children’s understanding of the numerical magnitudes 
represented by the upper end of the less-familiar number line may be limited (e.g. Barth, Starr, & 
Sullivan, 2009; Lipton & Spelke, 2005), rendering the reference point marked on the right side of 
the number line (100) unviable (cf. Barth & Paladino, 2011). These children’s estimates may 
therefore be made relative to only one reference point (the left endpoint) such that they are 
effectively open-ended. Only when children become more familiar with the entire number range 
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do they begin to understand how to use both available reference points (0 and 100), yielding a 
pattern of estimation predicted by the one-cycle proportional model. 
Overall, these findings provide evidence of the developmental progression predicted by 
the proportion-judgment account. While our observation of improved accuracy for the more 
familiar numerical range is consistent with the findings of previous studies, the present findings 
did not support the idea of a logarithmic-to-linear representational shift. Rather, the observed 
changes were better explained by the idea that the youngest children were more likely to make 
open-ended judgments, particularly on the less familiar range, producing estimates consistent
with an unbounded power function. The older children were better able to make appropriate 
proportional estimates, due probably to a greater understanding of the numerical magnitudes 
involved and perhaps of the task’s proportional structure as well.  
Do the predictions of the proportion-judgment account outperform those of the log-to-
linear shift account for other age groups and numerical ranges as well? In Experiment 2, we 
asked older children to perform similar numerical estimation tasks.
Experiment 2 
This experiment evaluated the predictions of the proportion-judgment account, 
comparing these to the predictions of the representational-shift account, with a slightly older age 
group (7- to 8-year-old children). Children again performed typical number-line estimation tasks 
on more and less familiar numerical ranges. The specific numerical ranges used in this 
experiment were 0-100 and 0-1000. 
Method 
Participants. Twenty-four 7- and 8-year-old children (16 males and 8 females, mean age 
8;0) completed the tasks of Experiment 2. The sample included 11 seven-year-olds (mean age 
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7;5) and 13 eight-year-olds (mean age 8;6). They were drawn from the same population as 
Experiment 1 and tested under the same circumstances. 
Stimuli. Stimuli included booklets identical to those used in Experiment 1, with the 
exception that each number line was labeled with a 0 at the left end and a 100 or 1000 at the right 
end (depending on the condition).
Design. As with Experiment 1, each child completed two conditions. For this age group, 
number lines for the “familiar” range were bounded by 0 and 100 and number lines for the  
“unfamiliar” range were bounded by 0 and 1000. Each condition presented a series of numbers 
sampled roughly evenly across the entire range (see Appendix A). The order of trials was 
randomized for each child. 
Procedure. The procedure for this experiment was the same as the procedure for 
Experiment 1, except that Experiment 2 used larger numerical ranges as described above.
Results
All of the children in this age group produced responses correlated with the presented 
number (rs, p<.05) and no child responded only within a small portion (<10%) of the number 
line; therefore data from all of the children were included. Analyses were conducted as in 
Experiment 1: an overall measure of accuracy (PAE) was computed, and explanations of 
children’s estimates were evaluated by comparing AICc scores and LOOCV indices for 
logarithmic, linear, and proportion-judgment models. 
Familiar range (0-100). The two-cycle version of the proportional model (consistent with 
the use of the two explicit endpoint values plus a midpoint; Hollands & Dyre, 2000) provided the 
best fit for the 7-to-8-year-old group’s  median data on the 0-100 task (R2=.990), ranking it first 
over linear (R2=.986), one-cycle (R2=.984), and logarithmic (R2=.856) models for group 
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performance (see Figure 3A; Appendix C). Analyses of individuals’ estimates reveal a similar 
trend, with the majority of the children (71%) producing one- or two-cycle estimation patterns 
(n=9 and n=8 respectively). The remaining children’s estimates were best fit by a linear model 
(n=7). 
Two-cycle proportion-judgment models are also preferred for both the 7-year-olds’ and 
8-year-olds’ estimates considered separately (Figures 3B; 3C; and Appendix B). Interestingly, 
the value of the exponent (β) for the 2-cycle fit of 7-year-olds’ estimates (β=.589) is notably 
lower than the value for 8-year-olds’ (β=.717). 
Unfamiliar range (0-1000). The two-cycle version of the proportional model (R2=.994) 
ranked first over linear (R2=.980), one-cycle (R2=.967), or logarithmic (R2=.560) models for 
group performance on the less familiar range (0-1000) (see Figure 3D; Appendix C). Again, 
analyses of individual children’s estimates show a similar distribution, with the majority of 
children (75%) producing estimates best accounted for by one-cycle (n=3) or two-cycle (n=14) 
versions of the proportional model.  
The two-cycle model provides the best account of estimation performance in both the 7-
year-old and 8-year-old groups (see Figures 3E and 3F). As in the familiar number-line task, β-
values increased across age groups (β=.348 for 7-year-olds’ medians and β=.560 for 8-year-olds’ 
medians), consistent with more accurate estimation by the older children.
Comparison across tasks. Even though performance on both the familiar and unfamiliar 
tasks shows the same 2-cycle pattern of over- and underestimation, mean PAE scores reveal that 
performance not only improves across age, but also across tasks (with mean PAE of 6.8% on the 
0-100 range and 10.4% on the 0-1000 range). Consistent with this finding of increased accuracy, 
observed β-values also increase across tasks. This is true for median estimates of the entire 7- 
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and 8-year-old group (β=.492 for the 0-1000 condition and β=.669 for the 0-100 condition) as 
well as for 7-year-olds (β=.348 for the 0-1000 condition and β=.589 for the 0-100 condition) and 
8-year-olds (β=.560 for the 0-1000 condition and β=.717 for the 0-100 condition) considered 
separately. In fact, β-values for all individuals producing consistent proportion-judgment patterns 
across tasks were higher (closer to 1) on the familiar range than on the unfamiliar range. 
Discussion
Number-line estimation performance in the 7- and 8-year-old age range was best 
characterized by the two-cycle version of the proportional model. This pattern of performance is 
predicted when observers use both the endpoints of the number line and a midpoint as reference 
points for their estimates. It appears that the 7- and 8-year-olds we tested were able to make use 
of a central reference point, and that estimation accuracy benefited as a result. Children’s 
estimation patterns provided no support for the log-to-linear-shift account. 
These findings, especially when considered in concert with the findings of Experiment 1 
on the 0-100 task, show quantitatively that one source of increased accuracy in number-line 
estimation comes from the use of additional reference points. The youngest children in 
Experiment 1 were apparently unable to make consistent use of upper endpoints (reflected by 
estimates best described by the unbounded power function). The older children in Experiment 1 
produced estimates that were best explained by the one-cycle proportional model, consistent with 
the reliable use of both lower and upper explicit endpoint values. The slightly older children of 
Experiment 2, however, produce the estimation patterns that are characteristic of the use of 3 
reference points (the two explicit endpoints plus a midpoint). Therefore the findings of 
Experiments 1 and 2 show the predicted developmental progression of one source of increased 
accuracy in this task: the appropriate use of additional reference points (see Figure 1).  
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Experiment 2 further shows that improved estimation accuracy does not arise solely from 
the use of additional reference points. Children’s estimates also revealed an overall decrease in 
estimation bias with age (reflected by β-values that were closer to 1 for older children) and for 
more familiar ranges. The idea that improved accuracy is associated with this kind of change, as 
predicted by the proportion-judgment account, is distinct from the idea that additional reference 
points confer improved accuracy.
In Experiment 3, 8- to 10-year-old children performed similar tasks for even larger 
numerical ranges. Again, the predictions of the proportion-judgment account were compared to 
those of the log-to-linear shift account. 
Experiment 3 
This experiment evaluated number-line estimation by 8- to 10-year-old children. Children 
again performed typical number-line estimation tasks on more and less familiar numerical
ranges. The specific numerical ranges used in this experiment were 0-1000 and 0-100000. 
Method 
Participants. Participants included 30 eight-, nine-, and ten-year-old children (19 males 
and 11 females, mean age 9;3) drawn from the same population and tested in the same locations 
as Experiments 1 and 2.  
Stimuli. Test booklets were identical to those of Experiments 1 and 2 except that number 
lines were labeled with a 0 at the left end and a 1000 or 100000 at the right end (depending on 
condition). 
Design. Children completed each of two conditions: the familiar range was bounded by 0 
and 1000 and the unfamiliar range was bounded by 0 and 100000. Test trials were randomly 
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selected from the entire number range (see Appendix A). The order of the trials was randomized 
for each child. 
Procedure. Procedures were identical to those of Experiments 1 and 2 except for the 
numbers used.  
Results
One child’s data was excluded from further analyses because responses were not 
correlated with the presented numbers on one of the two conditions (rs, p>.05). Another child 
was excluded for developmental delays (by parental report). This resulted in a total of 28 
children: 12 eight-year-olds (mean age 8;4), 8 nine-year-olds (mean age 9;7), and 8 ten-year-olds 
(mean age 10;5).
Familiar range (0-1000). As with the previous two experiments, performance on the 
familiar number range was relatively accurate, with mean PAE of 8.1%. As in Experiment 2, the 
two-cycle proportional model (R2=.990) was ranked first over linear (R2=.986), one-cycle 
(R2=.982) and logarithmic (R2=.482) models for group performance on the familiar 0-1000 task 
(see Figure 4A; Appendix D). The β-value for the two-cycle fit was .682 (slightly higher than the 
.492 β-value for the 7- to 8-year-old group on the same task).  
An evaluation of individual performance revealed that many of the children who 
produced estimates best characterized by a proportional model showed a one-cycle pattern (n=9). 
Moreover, estimates from most of the children producing a one-cycle pattern follow a distinct 
under-then-over pattern, with corresponding β-values greater than 1 (n=5, mean age 9;11). This 
unexpected finding, which contrasts with the over-then-under patterns found in the previous 
experiments (see Figures 2F and 3), will be addressed further in later sections.
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Analyses of the 8- and 9-year-olds’ estimates considered separately (Figures 4B and 4C) 
revealed a pattern similar to that of the 7- and 8-year-olds of Experiment 2, with median 
estimates in both cases best characterized by the two-cycle proportional model (with a β-value of 
.477 for 8-year-olds and .717 for 9-year olds). Ten-year-olds’ performance, on the other hand, 
was best characterized by a one-cycle version (R2=.979). And, consistent with the 
aforementioned analysis of individual children in which the older children produced under-then-
over estimation patterns, 10-year-olds’ median estimates show the same pattern of bias, resulting 
in β-values that exceed 1 (β=1.243; Figure 4D).  
Unfamiliar range (0-100000). As a group, 8- to 10-year-olds’ estimates (Figure 4E) are 
best explained by the two-cycle version of the proportional model (R2=.989, β=.540), 
outperforming linear (R2=.970), one-cycle (R2=.965), or logarithmic (R2=.309) models (see 
Appendix D). Analyses of individual performance on this range yield results similar to those 
from the familiar range. A majority of children (71%) produce estimates best predicted by the 
proportional model; some children produce estimates best explained by a one-cycle version 
(n=6), rather than a two-cycle version (n=13). Estimates of all children producing a one-cycle 
pattern showed an under-then-over pattern, with β-values greater than 1 (mean age 9;11).
Separating children according to year-of-age shows that the two-cycle version of the 
proportional model provides the best account of estimation biases for both 8- and 9-year-olds 
(R2=.944 and R2=.980 respectively), with the β-values obtained for group medians increasing 
across age groups (β=.349 for 8-year-olds and β=.547 for 9-year-olds; see Figures 4F and 4G). 
Ten-year-olds’ performance, on the other hand, was best characterized by a one-cycle version 
(R2=.978) with a β-value over 1 (β=1.398), corresponding to an under-then-over pattern of bias 
(Figure 4H). 
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Comparison across tasks. Overall group performance was more accurate for the familiar 
range (mean PAE=8.1%) than the unfamiliar range (mean PAE=10.7%). The two-cycle version 
of the proportional model was preferred as an explanation of group performance for both the 
familiar and unfamiliar ranges, with the degree of bias smaller for the familiar range (β=.682) 
than for the unfamiliar range (β=.540). This finding parallels the results of comparisons of 7- and 
8-year-olds’ performance on the 0-100 and 0-1000 number lines from Experiment 2.  
Comparisons across the familiar and unfamiliar number-line tasks also showed that the 
under-then-over pattern emerges with age and does not necessarily change according to 
familiarity with a given number range. Rather, 10-year-olds’ group median estimates follow this 
pattern on the more familiar 0-1000 range as well as the less familiar 0-100000 range. On the 
individual level, three of the five children who produced this pattern on the 0-1000 range did so 
on the 0-100000 range as well, while the other two did not; three more 10-year-olds showed this 
pattern on the 0-1000000 but not the 0-1000 range. These findings provide some evidence that 
this pattern may be characteristic of children’s number-line estimation strategies at later stages of
development but that it is not contingent on their overall familiarity with the number range. 
Discussion
Number-line estimation performance in the 8- to 10-year-old age group was best 
characterized by the two-cycle proportional model, suggesting that these children were able to 
make use of central reference points when making their estimates, much like the 7- and 8-year-
olds tested on smaller numerical ranges in Experiment 2. Children’s estimation patterns again 
provided no support for the log-to-linear-shift account. We discuss the overall findings from this 
experiment in combination with those of the other two experiments below. 
General Discussion 
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The idea that mental representations of numerical magnitude undergo a categorical shift 
has had a major influence on theoretical approaches to mathematical cognition as well as to 
cognitive development more broadly. Performance patterns on various numerical estimation 
tasks led to the development of this idea. However, the present work provides evidence for a 
different interpretation, building upon previous research showing that typical patterns of number-
line estimation performance are predicted by psychophysical models of proportion estimation 
(Barth & Paladino, 2011; Cohen & Blanc-Goldhammer, 2011; Sullivan et al., 2011). In the 
present paper, we evaluated the relative abilities of the representational-shift and the proportion-
judgment views to account for children’s estimates and further explored the sources of
developmental change underlying these patterns of performance.  
Children in three age groups (5- to 6-year-olds in Experiment 1, 7- to 8-year-olds in 
Experiment 2, and 8- to 10-year-olds in Experiment 3) completed typical number-line estimation 
tasks for both a familiar and a less familiar numerical range. We assessed the explanatory power 
of the quantitative models comprising each theoretical view for median estimates provided by 
each of the targeted broad age groups (5- to 6-year-olds, 7- to 8-year-olds, and 8- to 10-year-
olds). We also evaluated explanations of performance at more fine-grained subgroups (5-, 6-, 7-, 
8-, 9-, and 10-year-olds) and at the individual level. Overall, these data provide overwhelming 
evidence in favor of the proportion-judgment account: for both group and individual analyses 7, 
this account provided the best explanation of estimation patterns. We also emphasize that our 
findings do not rest on the choice of a particular model selection technique: in all cases, AICc 
and LOOCV analyses yielded consistent results. 
 Improvements in estimation performance are well characterized in terms of the sources 
of change described earlier. First, children’s patterns of performance suggest that accuracy can 
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improve through changes in the use of reference points (see Figure 1). The data suggest that very 
young children (such as 5-year-olds; see also Barth & Paladino, 2011) do not evaluate the upper 
endpoint of the number line appropriately. Some may be unable to use this reference point at all, 
treating the task as an open-ended magnitude judgment and producing highly biased estimates 
well characterized by an unbounded power function (Figure 1A). A child entirely lacking the 
ability to reason about proportions might also produce this pattern of performance; however, due 
to substantial evidence for various forms of proportional reasoning in young children (Barth, 
Baron, Carey, & Spelke, 2009; Boyer, Levine, & Huttenlocher, 2008; Boyer & Levine, in press; 
Duffy, Huttenlocher, & Levine, 2005; Jeong, Levine, & Huttenlocher, 2007; McCrink & Spelke, 
2010; Sophian & Wood, 1997; Spinillo & Bryant, 1991, 1999) and even infants (McCrink & 
Wynn, 2007), it seems more likely that this pattern arises from the failure to appropriately apply 
a proportional strategy to the task, or from a lack of accurate knowledge of the meaning of the 
upper endpoint numeral (and probably other numerals at the high end of the range), rather than 
from a total lack of proportional competence.
Slightly older children produce estimation patterns that suggest they are able to 
appropriately consider both endpoints when deciding on the location of the given number. This 
ability, appearing around age 6 in our task, allows children to make more accurate judgments and 
results in a pattern of bias characterized best by the one-cycle version of the proportional power 
model (Figure 1B). This might arise from a more robust ability to apply a proportional strategy 
to the task, or from a better understanding of the meanings of the larger numerals involved 
(consistent with previous findings; e.g. Barth, Starr, & Sullivan, 2009; Lipton & Spelke, 2005; 
see also Matthews & Chesney, 2011, for related findings in adults), or both. Somewhat older 
children (7- to 10-year-olds in this sample) appear able to use a midpoint value as a reference in 
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addition to the two explicitly labeled endpoints. These children show a biased estimation pattern 
that repeats itself around the midpoint, producing estimates best characterized by the two-cycle 
version of the proportional power model (Figure 1C; Hollands & Dyre, 2000).  
A second source of improvement inherent to the proportion-judgment account is reflected 
in the value of the β parameter, which gradually increases with age. For example, consider 
children’s performance on the 0-1000 task: across Experiments 2 and 3, a total of 52 children 
between 7 and 10 years of age completed this task. Of the forty children whose individual 
estimation patterns were best predicted by models of proportion judgment, corresponding β-
values strongly correlate with age in months, rs(40)=.652, p<.001 (see Figure 5). 
What We Can Conclude About Mental Representations of Number 
It is tempting to conclude from these and other recent findings that, once the proportional 
nature of the number-line estimation task has been taken into account, we may make simple and 
useful inferences about the nature and development of mental number representations from the 
data it yields. For example, the underlying power function in the proportion-judgment model 
could describe a representation of numerical magnitude that is highly compressed in younger 
children and becomes gradually less compressed with age, as evidenced by smooth change in the 
β parameter from values far below 1 to values near 1 (see also Barth & Paladino, 2011; Cohen & 
Blanc-Goldhammer, 2011; Sullivan et al., 2011).  
Although these ideas about compressed numerical magnitude representations may be 
correct (and broadly consistent with findings from other paradigms, e.g. Merten & Nieder, 2009), 
we urge caution in making such inferences directly from paradigms structured like typical 
number-line tasks for the following reason. These kinds of tasks involve the production of a 
spatial proportion – involving lengths or distances – as well as the estimation of a numerical 
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proportion; or, in the case of inverse “position-to-number” tasks (Ashcraft & Moore, 2011; 
Siegler & Opfer, 2003), the estimation of a spatial proportion and the production of a numerical 
proportion. Attributing performance patterns to numerical processing alone requires assuming 
that the spatial component of the task does not in itself contribute to variations in performance – 
that our estimation and production of spatial proportion is veridical. But a substantial set of 
findings shows that the estimation of spatial position is biased. For example, experimental 
paradigms structurally similar to number-line estimation have shown that both children and 
adults exhibit systematic bias when placing a mark on a remembered position within a linear 
space, or finding a hidden object in a long rectangular sandbox (e.g. Huttenlocher et al., 1994). 
Thus, because similar patterns of estimation bias are seen in a spatial task with no numbers, we 
cannot assume that bias in a spatial-numerical mapping task arises from numerical (not spatial) 
processing 8. 
Clearly, however, the β values observed in the present data do reflect bias in numerical 
processing, and not just in spatial processing. This is demonstrated by the finding that children 
produced more biased estimates for larger, less familiar numerical ranges than for smaller, more 
familiar ranges even though each of these tasks has identical spatial components. For instance, 7-
and 8-year-olds’ performance on both the more and less familiar number ranges was best 
characterized by the two-cycle version of the proportion-judgment model, but the value of β was 
closer to 1 on the familiar task than the unfamiliar task (β=.669 and β=.492, respectively; see 
Figures 3A and 3D). In fact, 21 of the 23 children who produced the same proportion-judgment 
estimation pattern across tasks yielded β-values that were closer to 1 on the familiar range (see
Teghtsoonian, 1973, for related findings in different tasks). This finding suggests that numerical 
processing does contribute, but that β is not a simple index of some stable characteristic of the 
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child’s mental representation of numerical magnitude (this may not be surprising given the 
considerable debate over the psychological meaning of the parameters of Stevens’ Law; e.g. 
Laming, 1997; Teghtsoonian, 1973). Moreover, given the well-known spatial biases that arise in 
similarly structured tasks, spatial processing likely also contributes to the values of β we observe 
here, and to the estimates of children and adults in number-line tasks in general. 
Questions for Future Research 
An unexpected finding arose from the oldest children’s data. We found that the direction 
of bias seen in younger children (the typical over-then-under pattern seen for example in our 7- 
and 8-year-olds’ data, Figure 3) reversed itself with age and experience, with the oldest children 
(our 10-year-olds) producing instead an under-then-over pattern such that their observed β-
values were greater than 1 (see Figures 4D and 4H). This suggests that as children’s estimates 
gradually become less biased, their estimates do not simply become more and more accurate, 
constantly approaching perfect performance (with β-values growing until they approximate 1). 
Rather, these under-then-over estimation patterns in our oldest children suggest that the values of 
β may eventually “overshoot” 1. To our knowledge, the emergence of this reversal in the 
direction of number-line estimation bias over development has not yet been reported, so the 
reason for it is not yet well understood. However, this finding appears to be robust, as a slight 
under-then-over pattern has been observed in adult’s estimation performance (see Cohen & 
Blanc-Goldhammer, 2011) and a reversal in the direction of bias in older vs. younger children 
has also been observed in a related task (Ashcraft & Moore, 2011; Slusser & Barth, manuscript 
in preparation). 
Two findings in particular may be relevant to future investigations of this reversal. First, 
β-values over 1 were associated only with children whose estimates were best explained by the 
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one-cycle version of the proportion-judgment model, suggesting that these children did not make 
their estimates in relation to unmarked central reference points. Second, the tendency to produce 
the under-then-over pattern seems to be consistent within children: those who generated this 
estimation pattern for a more familiar numerical range were also likely do so for a less familiar 
range. One possible speculative explanation of the reversal is that older children (and perhaps 
adults) are, at least implicitly, aware of an erroneous tendency to overestimate values on the 
lower end of the number line and therefore overcorrect for this bias, resulting in the opposite 
under-then-over trend. Further studies, however, are needed to explore the reasons for this 
pattern of performance. 
Conclusions 
We believe these data provide strong evidence against two prominent theoretical ideas: 
that children’s number-line estimates transparently indicate the forms of their mental 
representations of number, and that developmental changes in estimation patterns implicate a 
discontinuous shift from logarithmic to linear mental representations. These studies show that 
understanding number-line estimation and structurally similar tasks in terms of proportion 
estimation can explicate patterns of bias in children’s performance. The systematic patterns 
emerging from estimation performance across this 5-year span also provides evidence that 
increased task proficiency across development is attributable to a process of developmental 
change with at least one gradual component. 
This work further shows that models of proportion estimation, developed originally for 
perceptual tasks, can be usefully applied to tasks that involve more abstract assessments of 
numerical magnitude. That is to say, children’s (and adults’) estimates of numerical magnitude in 
bounded tasks apparently share many characteristics with estimates of non-numerical perceptual 
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magnitude in tasks that are both explicitly and implicitly bounded (see Cohen & Blanc-
Goldhammer, 2011; Hollands & Dyre, 2000). We also speculate that these findings, despite the 
rather specific type of task investigated here, may relate usefully to other work showing that 
proportional reasoning is perhaps more ubiquitous than has commonly been thought (see Balci & 
Gallistel, 2006; Hollands & Dyre, 2000). 
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Footnotes 
1 It is important to note that this pattern of performance (estimates that are well described 
by simple power or log functions) could arise in this task from many possible strategies likely to 
be used by young children with a poor understanding of the task structure and/or little knowledge 
of the numbers presented. The use of essentially open-ended magnitude judgments is just one 
example; counting up from the left side of the number line by arbitrarily chosen units is another. 
Some children, moreover, may try to reference the upper endpoint but lack the accurate 
knowledge of its value that is necessary for a reasonably accurate proportion estimate (that is, 
they try to compare the magnitude of “30” to the magnitude of “100,” but they don’t yet know 
what “100” means). These children will also produce similar power- or logarithmic-looking 
estimates (Barth & Paladino, 2011). For these and other reasons, the applicability of a particular 
type of function to number-line estimation patterns should not be taken as evidence for a 
corresponding mental representation of number. 
2 We do not test the predictions of segmented linear models for two reasons. First, they
were explicitly tested by Barth & Paladino (2011), and model selection procedures (Burnham & 
Anderson, 2002) found them to be unsupported. Second, visual inspection strongly suggests that 
the data we report here provide little if any support for such models.  
3 As part of another study, children first completed a Position to Number (PN) task in
which they were given a marked number line and asked which number went with that mark. Data 
from the PN task will not be discussed here. 
4 A Microsoft Excel worksheet for performing simple versions of these analyses (Slusser 
& Barth, n.d.) is freely available at http://eslusser.faculty.wesleyan.edu/. 
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5 This analysis first divides each data set into a calibration sample of N-1 and a validation 
sample of 1. The model of interest is then fit to the calibration sample. This is repeated such that
each observation in the sample is used once as the validation sample. An error index (the mean 
standard error or MSE) for each iteration is calculated, with the average MSE across all iterations
summarizing the model’s fit.  
6 Comparisons of R2 values do not take model complexity into account so they should not 
be used for comparing the models tested here. 
7 Though the 5- and 6-year-old group’s median performance on the 0-20 number-line was 
ostensibly linear, individual analyses showed that the majority of these children (14 out of 20) 
produced estimates that are more consistent with the proportion-judgment account.
8 Very similar patterns of bias arise in a variety of other tasks involving the estimation of 
magnitudes within a bounded response range (e.g. the width of schematic fish, Duffy, 
Huttenlocher, & Crawford, 2006; Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Vevea, 2000; and the lightness of a 
grey square, Huttenlocher et al., 2000). Although these studies are conceptually situated in a 
larger literature examining category effects on stimulus judgment, it is worth noting that many of 
these findings appear consistent with the proportion estimation models used here. The relation 
between these models – the less constrained but perhaps more broadly generalizable Category 
Adjustment Model (e.g. Huttenlocher et al., 2000) and the more parsimonious but possibly less 
general Cyclical Power Model of Proportion Judgment (e.g. Hollands & Dyre, 2000; Hollands et 
al., 2002) – remains to be determined.  
         46 Developmental Change  
Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Predictions of the proportion judgment account. Figure 1A depicts a one-parameter 
unbounded power function (with the scaling factor, α, fixed at 10). Figures 1B and C depict one-
and two-cycle versions of the proportional power model, respectively. The two-cycle version of 
the model depicts the predicted estimation pattern for observers who use the midpoint of the 
number line as a reference point.  
Figure 2. Median estimates of 5- and 6-year-olds on each task. Estimated number corresponds to 
the marked position on the number line. The solid line represents the preferred model. The 
dashed line shows y=x. 
Figure 3. Median estimates of the 7- and 8-year-olds on each task. Estimated number 
corresponds to the marked position on the number line. The solid line represents the preferred 
model. The dashed line shows y=x. 
Figure 4. Median estimates of 8- to 10-year-olds on each task. The solid line represents the 
preferred model. The dashed line shows y=x. 
Figure 5. Values of the β parameter corresponding to the estimates of each child whose 
performance is best predicted by the proportion judgment account on the 0-1000 number-line 
task (n=40). 
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Figure 1. 
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Figure 2. 
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Figure 3.
Note. The 7- and 8-year-olds’ median estimate for the number 52 on the 0-1000 number line (represented by an open 
circle) was a statistical outlier and was excluded from the corresponding analyses. Nearly half of the children 
produced estimates that were much too high, tending to place “52” near the position for “500”. 
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Figure 4.
Note. Median estimates represented as open circles (corresponding to 5652 and 10870 for 8-year-olds’ performance, 
5652 for 10-year-olds’ performance, and 5652 for the 8-10 year-old group performance on the 0-100000 number
line) were statistical outliers and excluded from analyses. Again, these outliers result from many children 
misinterpreting the decimal value – placing, for example, the number 5652 closer to 500000 than 5000.   
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Figure 5. 
Age (in months) 
+ Unbounded Version (n=3) 
□ One-Cycle Version (n=12) 
• Two-Cycle Version (n=25) 








52 Developmental Change  
Appendix A 
Complete List of Numbers Presented in Test Trials for Each Experiment 
 0-20 Number Line (Experiment 1): 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12, 14, 16, 17, and 18 
0-100 Number Line (Experiments 1 & 2): 3, 6, 8, 12, 14, 17, 21, 24, 29, 33, 39, 42, 48, 52, 58, 
61, 67, 71, 76, 79, 83, 86, 88, 92, 94, and 97. 
0-1000 Number Line (Experiment 2): 3, 7, 19, 52, 103, 158, 240, 297, 346, 391, 438, 475, 525, 
562, 609, 654, 703, 760, 842, 897, 948, 981, 993, and 997 
0-1000 Number Line (Experiment 3): 8, 15, 25, 56, 109, 154, 237, 290, 338, 388, 430, 467, 517, 
560, 599, 650, 696, 761, 839, 889, 939, 980, 989, and 993 
0-100000 Number Line (Experiment 3): 870, 1522, 2609, 5652, 10870, 15435, 23696, 29022, 
33805, 38478, 43043, 46739, 51739, 56087, 60000, 65217, 69783, 76087, 83913, 88913, 93913, 
98043, 98913, and 99348. 
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Appendix B 
Estimates of Relative Support for Each Model, Experiment 1
0-20 Number Line 0-100 Number Line 
R2 AICc Δ AICc R2 AICc Δ AICc 
Log-to-Linear Logarithmic 0.776 23.678 24.269 0.844 111.982 32.795 
Shift Models Model 
Linear 0.980* -0.591* --- 0.944 85.451 6.263 
Model 
Proportion Unbounded 0.897 13.969 14.559 0.952* 79.187* ---
Judgment Version 
Models
One-Cycle 0.931 9.851 10.441 0.926 90.421 11.234 
Version 
Two-Cycle 0.935 9.295 9.885 0.765 120.583 41.396 
Version 
* Indicates the preferred model (i.e., the model yielding the lowest AICc value and lowest LOOCV error index).
Notes: Δ AICc refers to the difference in AICc values compared to the preferred model. As a guide to interpreting
these results, we include the benchmarks proposed by Burnham and Anderson (2002) below:
As a rough rule of thumb, models having a Δ within 1-2 of the [preferred] model have
substantial support and should receive considerations in making inferences. Models having Δ
within about 4-7 of the [preferred] model have considerably less support, while models with Δ
> 10 have either essentially no support and might be omitted from further consideration or at
least fail to explain some substantial structural variation in the data. (pp. 446). 
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Appendix C 
Estimates of Relative Support for Each Model, Experiment 2 
R2
0-100 Number Line 
AICc Δ AICc R2
0-1000 Number Line 





0.644 150.790 95.797 0.566 256.732 89.182 
Linear 
Model 






















0.990* 54.994* --- 0.989* 167.550* ---
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Appendix D 
Estimates of Relative Support for Each Model, Experiment 3 
R2
0-1000 Number Line 
AICc Δ AICc 
0-100000 Number Line 





0.368 233.711 84.626 0.277 450.321 91.916 
Linear 
Model 






















0.988* 149.085* --- 0.988* 358.405* ---
